A conflicted sense of nationality: Napoleon III’s Arab Kingdom and the paradoxes of French multiculturalism by Murray-Miller, Gavin
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/75046/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Murray-Miller, Gavin 2014. A conflicted sense of nationality: Napoleon III’s Arab Kingdom and
the paradoxes of French multiculturalism. French Colonial History 15 (1) , pp. 1-37. file 
Publishers page: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/french_colonial_histo...
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/french_colonial_history/v015/15.murray-miller.html>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
This article originally appeared in: French Colonial History, vol. 15. April 2014. Michigan State University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
³$&RQIOLFWHG6HQVHRI1DWLRQDOLW\ 
1DSROHRQ,,,¶V$UDE.LQJGRPDQGWKH3DUDGR[HVRI)UHQFK0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVP´ 
Gavin Murray-Miller 
 
 
Who gets to be French? How does one become French? What does it mean to be French? These 
are question that have been posed over the past decade as France exhibits an ever more defensive 
posture regarding the subject of its national identity.1 Fears over immigration²and especially 
the growing number of Muslims in the country²have come to play a central role in a variety of 
issues ranging from the sustainability of French social welfare programs to the preservation of an 
authentically French culture and way of life.2 State policies bolstering an aggressive secularism 
and mounting protests spurred by the social exclusion faced by immigrant and Muslim youths 
have become symbolic of the alleged incompatibility between French values and Muslim culture 
in the twenty-first century7KHSDLULQJRI³)UHQFK´ZLWK³PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP´DSSHDUVDOPRVWD
contradiction in terms as scholDUVLQFUHDVLQJO\UHPDUNXSRQ)UHQFKUHSXEOLFDQLVP¶VSDWHQW
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hostility to cultural diversity, the explicitly Gallic brand of racism it promotes and the threat 
globalization currently presents to French universalism.3 More broadly, the growing interest in 
FreQFKLPPLJUDWLRQSROLFLHVDQGWKHVWDWH¶VDYHUVLRQWR$PHULFDQ-style multiculturalism reflect 
JHQHUDOFRQFHUQVRYHUWKHFKDQJLQJFXOWXUDOJHRJUDSK\RI(XURSH¶VSRVWFRORQLDOQDWLRQ-states 
and the consolidation of peripheral ethno-religious identities that have raised serious questions as 
to the future of the national and secular polities long considered central to Western modernity.4 
 7KHFRQWURYHUVLHVJHQHUDWHGE\WKHLVVXHRI³,VODPLQ)UDQFH´KDYHURXWLQHO\WUDQVODWHG
LQWRFULWLTXHVRI)UDQFH¶VQDWLRQDOLVW heritage and, in more specific terms, the French idée 
republicaine rooted in the promise of a secular and egalitarian society. The centrality of 
republicanism to these assessments has, however, tended to obscure a far more nuanced history 
chronicling FranFH¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKGLYHUVLW\LQWKHPRGHUQSHULRG7KHIDFWWKDWUHSXEOLFDQ
ideas of nationhood and nationality competed with alternate possibilities for most of the 
nineteenth century has often been muted. The republican narrative²commonly read as FrancH¶V
path to modernity²persists to cast a long shadow across a tumultuous and fractious post-
revolutionary history in which the republican model was hardly a fait accompli. Throughout the 
century, French statesmen, administrators and intellectuals of varying ideological persuasions 
actively sought out and proposed alternatives to republican nationhood as they attempted to 
balance concerns over political rights, legal statuses and questions of national belonging.5 The 
current focus on whether a republican France can accommodate the cultural pluralism of the 
present has eclipsed decades of non-republican efforts to contend with the realities of difference 
in an age of growing national identification.  
The years prior to the founding of the Third Republic marked a period of intense debate 
on a broad range of issues relevant to French national identity, political inclusion and national 
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boundaries that have yet to be fully appreciated by historians. While the ruling Bonapartist 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VVWURQJO\-nationalist political platform during the 1850s and 1860s provided a 
backdrop for these debates, French $OJHULDDQGWKH6HFRQG(PSLUH¶VFRORQLDOSROLFLHVSOD\HGD
substantial role in animating the ³SROLWLFVRI)UHQFKQHVV´WKDWHPHUJHGLQQDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOOLIHDW
mid-century.6 On 6 February 1863, Emperor Napoleon III galvanized the public with an official 
PHPRUDQGXPSULQWHGLQ)UHQFKDQG$UDELFGHFODULQJWKDW$OJHULDZDVQRW³DFRORQ\SURSHUO\
VDLGEXWUDWKHUDQ$UDE.LQJGRP´7 Outlining an ambitious plan for Muslim social integration 
and the maintenance of religious tolerance in the territory, Napoleon III professed his intentions 
RI³UHJHQHUDWLQJ´DIDOOHQ$UDEQDWLRQDOLW\DQGWUDQVIRUPLQJ$OJHULDLQWRD)UDQFR-Muslim 
homeland open to Europeans and natives alike. FashiRQLQJKLPVHOI³(PSHURURIWKH$UDEVMXVWDV
PXFKDV(PSHURURIWKH)UHQFK´KHLPSORUHG(XURSHDQVHWWOHUVWRORRNXSRQ$OJHULDQ0XVOLPV
DV³FRPSDWULRWV´HVFKHZLQJWKHGHPRUDOL]LQJQRWLRQWKDWWKH\ZHUH³VDYDJHV´RU,VODPLF
³IDQDWLFV´8  
Within days of the official announcement, protests broke out in the colony as irate colons 
denounced the Emperor and his entourage as traitors to their nationality and civilization. 
$OJHULDQQHZVSDSHUVUDQHGLWRULDOVDQGSULQWHGOHWWHUVH[HFUDWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDSLWXODWion 
WR³$UDEEDUEDULVP´DQGZDUQLQJRIWKH³)UDQFR-0XVOLPFRQVSLUDF\´EHLQJKDWFKHGLQ3DULV9 
According to one particularly acerbic petition, the imperial government was not only sacrificing 
³WKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHpatrie DQGFLYLOL]DWLRQ´RXWRI³FRQWHPSWIRU(XURSHDQVRFLHW\´EXWZDV
GHPDQGLQJWKDW)UDQFH³DEGLFDWHLWVFLYLOL]LQJUROH´10 While state officials and pro-imperial 
MRXUQDOLVWVFKDONHGXSWKHFRORQLVWV¶UHDFWLRQWRWKHUDFLVPDQGSUHMXGLFHVKDUERUHGE\WKHVHWWOHU
population, the issue was hardly that simple. At stake was not only the colon hope of a Gallicized 
Algeria connected politically and culturally to the metropole. As would become evident, the 
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Arab Kingdom controversy provoked fundamental questions over one of the core concepts 
underpinning perceptions of French identity and selfhood in the nineteenth century: nationalité, 
the essential quality defining one as French.   
Nationalité has constituted a central tenet of French politics and identity for over two 
centuries; and yet, despite (or perhaps because of) its saliency, the term has habitually possessed 
a remarkably protean character. Since the Revolution, ideas of Frenchness have encompassed a 
YDULHW\RIOHJDODQGSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVUHIOHFWLRQVRQ³QDWXUDO´DQGKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPent, 
and assumptions regarding the vital role of culture in national life. From the 1790s onward, 
conflicting interpretations of nation and people vacillated between political and ethno-cultural 
definitions.11 7KRVHORRNLQJWR)UDQFH¶VUHSXEOLFDQKHULWDJHWraditionally emphasized unity over 
pluralism and ethnic identification, seeing the nation as a political construct in which the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHFROOHFWLYHOLIHRIWKHFRPPXQLW\SURYLGHGWKHPHDQVRI
transcending particularism and difference.12 A second strand of French nationalism, however, 
HQFRXUDJHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI³QDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU´DQGGHHSO\-rooted cultural traits in 
categorizing nation and people. These dual paradigms proposing distinctly different concepts of 
nationality and community consistently lay at the heart of the French national imaginary and, 
more often than not, were blended or conflated to suit specific ideological positions as needed.13 
During the 1850s and 1860s, Bonapartist ideologues saw little conflict in espousing liberal-
republican sentiments in their promotion of French nationalité while simultaneously relying 
upon a discourse of national and cultural exceptionalism. Represented as both a liberal nation-
state and a communitarian ethnic nation, the Second Empire testified to nationalité¶VH[FHHGLQJO\
fluid and paradoxical nature throughout the nineteenth century. Studies examining the new style 
of nationalist politics inaugurated by the Bonapartists at mid-century have tended to minimize 
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this dualism and the problems it presented for the regime, especially when it came to the 
(PSHURU¶VKRSHRIHVWDEOLVKLQJD)UHQFK$UDE.LQJGRPRQWKHVKRUHVRIWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ14   
Although the Arab Kingdom has typically been treated by historians²and rightfully so²
as a failed colonial policy,15 WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIDQ$UDEL]HG)UHQFKWHUULWRU\DQGWKHUHJLPH¶V
efforts to cultivate an Arab identity tied to France furnish an opportunity to rethink the 
significance of nationalité in French identity politics and the troubling relationship between 
³)UHQFK´DQG³0XVOLP´WKDWKDVUHPDLQHGDKDOOPDUNRI)UDQFH¶V republican nationhood. 
Throughout the post-revolutionary period, elites of various ideological backgrounds were 
actively engaged in efforts to reimagine French society after the traumatic upheavals of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Revisiting these alternatives not only subjects the 
narrative of republican modernity to scrutiny; it equally invites reflection on what Ian Coller has 
UHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³SDUDOOHOGLYHUVLW\´RIWKHSDVWWKDW existed alongside paths to European 
nationhood.16 Critiques of republican ideology and society tend to marginalize this parallel 
GLYHUVLW\FRPPRQO\ZRUNLQJZLWKLQWKHELQDU\ORJLFRI³VHFXODU´>laïque@DQG³UHOLJLRXV´
³2FFLGHQW´DQG³2ULHQW´RU³SDUWLFXODU´DQG³XQLYHUVDO´WKDWKDYHLQIRUPHGUHSXEOLFDQ
assimilationist objectives and shaped categorical distinctions between French and Muslim 
identity.17 Although these oppositions were present in competing ideological discourses of the 
time, they often proved adaptable to alternative readings of identity and community counter to 
the republican model. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, assimilation was hardly the 
SUHGRPLQDQWLGHRORJ\XQGHUSLQQLQJ)UDQFH¶V1RUWK$IULFDQSROLFLHV&ROonial and metropolitan 
officials did articulate national imaginaries that deviated from the assimilatory rhetoric of the 
republicaQ³FLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQ´DQG highlighted FranFH¶VDELOLW\WRHPEUDFH cosmopolitanism and 
³DVVRFLDWH´ZLWKIRUHLJQFXOWXUHVDWHUPFRPPRQO\GHQRWLQJVWDWHPHGLDWLRQLQ³IRUHLJQ´
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communities residing in French territory and the granting of special dispensations to specific 
ethnic and religious groups.18 
A closer examination of French nation and empire building in the years prior to the Third 
Republic holds the prospect of expanding our understanding of key concepts like nationality, 
citizenship and multiculturalism, highlighting the often understated role that the Second Empire 
played in defining French views of cultural diversity. It also underscores the importance of 
colonialism in shaping reflexive understandings of national selfhood and belonging as Napoleon 
,,,¶V$UDE.LQJGRPEHFDPHDIRFDOSRLQWIRUWKHDUWLFXODWLRQRIconflicting ideas of nationalité 
during the 1860s. The increasing attention given to imperial borderlands and the mutually-
constitutive relationship binding nations and empires in contemporary scholarship has 
dramatically altered our understandings of modern nation-states and their internal dynamics.19 
The coterminous dimensions characterizing nation and empire building during the years of the 
Second Empire suggests that efforts to integrate and assimilate Muslim populations have been a 
FRQVLVWHQWIHDWXUHRI)UDQFH¶VPRGHUQSolitical history antedating its current republican polity. 
Consequently, a new understanding of how these encounters influenced conceptions of 
nationality, citizenship and the identity politics they inevitably generated needs to be considered. 
 
Janus Faced Nationalism 
In an exposé published in the summer of 1852, the political commentator Edward Warmington 
began his examination of French society with a familiar and by most standards commonplace 
narrative. Since 1789, the country had been torn apart by revolutionary antagonisms, public 
prosperity had dwindled and faith in French government was increasingly diminishing with each 
IDOOHQUHJLPH³2XUSROLWLFDOGLYLVLRQVKDYHGHJHQHUDWHGLQWRSHUVRQDOKDWUHGVDQGKRVWLOLWLHV´KH
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DSSULVHGKLVUHDGHUV³DQGRXUGLIIHUHQFHVRIRSLQLRQKDYHQHDUOy made us forget our nationalité, 
RXULQWHUHVWVDQGRXUFRPPRQGXWLHV´20 Neither erudite nor exceptionally shrewd in its analysis, 
:DUPLQJWRQ¶VERRNQRQHWKHOHVVHSLWRPL]HG the new tenor of politics growing up across Europe 
following the nationalist revolutions that had roiled the continent in 1848. Despite the political 
failures of the revolutionary movements at mid-century, the idiom of nationalité that had called a 
generation to arms was sustained and would increasingly come to suffuse the political discourse 
of both the left and right within the coming years.21 ³1DWLRQDOLW\LVWKHUHDOUHOLJLRQRI)UDQFH
´remarked one critic observing the political situation in 1861³,WLVPRUHWKDQDSULQFLSOHRU
VHQWLPHQW$WSUHVHQWLWLVDQXQ\LHOGLQJLQVWLQFW´22     
The appeal of nationalité in France was, in large part, the product of the revived 
Napoleonic Empire headed by Napoleon III and his Bonapartist supporters in the wake of 1848. 
%URXJKWWRSRZHUWKURXJKDFRXSG¶pWDWWKHQHZO\-founded Second Empire had, from the 
beginning, reflected the nationalist Gestalt prevalent to European politics of the period. While 
the legality of the government remained questionable, national referendums, the maintenance of 
universal manhood suffrage and ardent appeals to patriotism aimed to provide the regime with a 
semblance of popular legitimacy. Inheriting a France destabilized by chronic partisan divisions 
and social antagonisms, the Bonapartists presented the new empire as a government of national 
reconciliation and unity committed to nurturing a common sense of community and 
compatriotism among Frenchmen. ³$SHRSOHSRVVHVVIRUFH´the Emperor reminded his 
IROORZHUV³RQO\E\YLUWXHRIWKeir nationalité´23 Such pronouncements became ubiquitous as the 
Bonapartist consolidated their power, making nationalité a virtual mantra of the new imperial 
regime.     
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Taking their cue from the Emperor, propagandists and proponents of the new government 
played upon fears of national dissolution and pervasive anarchy, lauding Napoleon III as the 
saYLRURIWKH)UHQFKQDWLRQ³)UHQFKQDWLRQDOLW\QRORQJHUH[LVWHG´WKHSROLWLFDOZULWHU&KDUOHV
3LHOGH7URLVPHQWVUHPDUNHGZKHQUHFRXQWLQJ)UDQFH¶VWXUEXOHQWKLVWRU\VLQFH³1DSROHRQ
,,,KDVJLYHQLWDQHZOLIH´24 For Bonapartists, the Napoleonic parYHQXHPERGLHGWKH³VHQWLPHQWV
DQGSURYLGHQWLDOLQVWLQFWV´RIWKH)UHQFKSHRSOH25 With typical patriotic flair, the Duc de 
3HUVLJQ\1DSROHRQ,,,¶VPRVWOR\DOdevotée, flaunted the popular and demotic character of the 
JRYHUQPHQWZLWKKLVDVVHUWLRQWKDW³EHIore [the Empire] rallied all the forces of the nation, it was 
ERUQLQWKHFRWWDJHVRIWKHSHRSOH´26 7KLVQDWLRQDOLVWUKHWRULFHTXDOO\H[WHQGHGWR1DSROHRQ,,,¶V
foreign policy and his public support for oppressed nationalities throughout Europe. According 
to one pamphleteer, the Emperor perceptively understood the integral nature of nationality to 
PRGHUQVRFLHW\ZKLFKUHVLVWHGDOOIRUPVRI³FRQTXHVWIDQDWLFLVPDULVWRFUDF\DQGSULYLOHJH´
³7KHZRUOGPRYHVDORQJWKLVSDWK´WKHDXWKRULQVLVWHG³SURFHHGLQJmore surely and quickly 
EHFDXVHLWKDVIRXQGLQ1DSROHRQ,,,ZKRXQGHUVWDQGVLWVDVSLUDWLRQVLWVSLORW´27 
While Second Empire politics exhibited a brazenly nationalist tenor and attitude focused 
on the cult of the Emperor, nationalism itself was nothing new to French politics. The concept of 
la nation already possessed a long history rooted in the intellectual and political culture of the 
Ancien Régime.28 During the late-eighteenth century, revolutionaries had placed la nation at the 
center of their political program, imagining a new type of community and politics that would 
effectively redefine established notions of identity and territory over the course of the following 
century.29 National association, as the revolutionary Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès declared in 
6HSWHPEHULPSOLHGWKDW³)UDQFHLVDQGPXVWEHDVLQJOHZKROH´FRQVWLWXWHGWKURXJKWKH
collective actions and will of a sovereign people.30 In the view of Rousseau and his republican 
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acolytes, a nation was understood to be a political community formed of individuals invested 
with equal rights and, theoretically, partaking in the general will through an active civic 
participation.31 ,WDVVXPHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRID³FRPPXQLW\RIFLWL]HQV´WKDWWUDQVFHQGHGHWKQLFDQG
religious differences and attached the individual to the collective life of society.32 The Code 
napoléon issued in 1804 reinforced such revolutionary desires for national unity by equating 
nationality with the principle of equality²or, more specifically, equality before the law²
enunciated in 1789, making nationality synonymous with the rights enjoyed by all French 
citizens.33 
Yet if the civil code YDOLGDWLQJWKHUHSXEOLFDQQRWLRQRID³FRPPXQLW\RIFLWL]HQV´WKLV
alone hardly indicated who in fact belonged to this community or the criteria for membership 
within it. The Revolution had never adequately resolved this question. Some, like the deputy J. 
0&RXSpLQKDGLQVLVWHGWKDWWKH)UHQFKSHRSOHFRQVWLWXWHGD³SURIXVHIDPLO\´ERXQGE\D
shared commitment to liberty that was theoretically accessible to all like-minded individuals 
regardless of origin.34 Jacobin nationalists, however, denounced this unbridled cosmopolitanism 
on the grounds of national security, favoring a vision of the French people defined in historic and 
³QDWXUDO´WHUPVWKDW excluded individuals born outside the country or to foreign parents. The civil 
code of 1804 subsequently upheld this conviction. Under article 9, French nationals were 
determined through the principle of ius sanguinis while residency requirements were established 
for foreigners and national minorities living in the country.35 Nationality continued to remain a 
primarily political category, but one defined and conditioned by the public authority of the 
state.36 Over the coming years, successive post-revolutionary regimes would slowly amend the 
provisions laid out in the civil code, shrouding nationalité in an ambiguity for most of the 
nineteenth century.37      
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The term nationalité itself was a neologism of the nineteenth century, first appearing in 
the DictionaLUHGHO¶$FDGpPLHIUDQoDLVHonly in 1835. Initially tied to a language of universal 
rights and citizenship, it was not a concept merely reducible to political and legal categorizations 
and, over time, became divorced from its democratic-revolutionary context in more common 
XVDJH'XULQJWKH5HVWRUDWLRQDQG-XO\0RQDUFK\GLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQ³FLYLO´DQG³SROLWLFDO´
rights muted the democratic connotations associated with Frenchness, entailing that to be French 
did not imply participating in the Rousseauvian community of citizens but rather adhering to the 
French legal code.38 Perennially suspicious of popular sovereignty, nineteenth-century liberals 
endorsed a vision of the nation rooted in its historical and organic unity, judiciously 
marginalizing the importance of the Revolution in favor of continuity with the past.39 The 
Algerian polemicist Jules Duval remained reticent on the subjects of citizenship and rights when 
UHIOHFWLQJRQWKH³HVVHQWLDOLGHD´RIDOOQDWLRQDOLWLHVLQGHILQLQJLWDV³DFHUWDLQFonception 
of history, aspirations, public sentiments and collective cooperation that transforms a mass of 
SHRSOHSRVVHVVLQJGLVSDUDWHRULJLQVODQJXDJHVDQGIDLWKVLQWRDVLQJOHVRXO´40 As the basis of 
collective life and experience, nationality forged an intimate and indissoluble bond between 
diverse peoples, resisting the anomie and social fragmentation generated by political, 
confessional or ethnic divisions. Without the common unity sustained by national association, 
society remained only a confusing maVVRI³GLVDJJUHJDWHGSDUWV´DVWKHFULWLF-HDQ-Gabriel 
&DSSRWRSLQHGLQ³JUDLQVRIVDQGZLWKRXWFHPHQW>DQG@DWRPVZLWKRXWOLQNV´41  
Almost paradoxically, however, the revolutionary discourse which gave substance to the 
idea of a French nation and national community also associated France with a broader set of 
ideas and sentiments that transcended national boundaries. In the most radical phase of the 
French Revolution, republicans endeavored to carry the revolutionary élan across Europe, 
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declaring that the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity were not only French, but those of 
humanity and civilization in general. French national identity was, from its origins, tied to a 
universal and inclusive rhetoric which identified France as the repository of common values and 
aspirations.42 ³,Q(QJODQG*HUPDQ\,WDO\DQG6SDLQWKHUHLVH[SUHVVHGRQO\WKHGHVWLQLHVRI
(QJODQG*HUPDQ\,WDO\DQG6SDLQ´WKHUHSXEOLFDQ+LSSRO\WH0DUOHWFODLPHGLQ³,Q
)UDQFHWKHGHVWLQ\RIPDQNLQGLVH[SUHVVHG´43 Jean-Gabriel Cappot expressed as much in his 
study on nationality, insisting that while other nations were comprised of distinct groups that 
³UHWDLQHGWKHQDPHRIWKHLUUDFHDQGWKHPDUNRIWKHLUQDWXUHDVDIRUPRISURWHVW)UDQFHDORQH
truly repreVHQWHGDXQLW\DQDWLRQDOLW\´44 'HVSLWH&DSSRW¶VEHOLHILQWKHHQFRPSDVVLQJDQG
universal ideals represented by France, he, like Marlet, could not resist the temptation to attribute 
something definitively French to this universalism. 
This recognition of a French exception hinted at a second thread of nationalism owing 
more to the liberal and romantic outlooks prevalent during the nineteenth century than the 
Enlightenment. In contrast to the abstract and often cosmopolitan outlook of the philosophes, the 
post-revolutionary generation cultivated an appreciation for the particular historical experiences 
DQGFXOWXUDOLQIOXHQFHVWKDWVKDSHGWKHFKDUDFWHUDQGPHQWDOLW\RIDSHRSOH³(YHU\SHRSOHKDVLWV
GLVWLQFWJHQLXV´WKHVDYDQW+LSSRO\WH7DLQHDIILUPHG³WKDW is why each people has its distinct 
KLVWRU\´45 1DWLRQVOLNHLQGLYLGXDOVSRVVHVVHGDXQLTXH³SHUVRQDOLW\´-HDQ$OH[DQGHU9DLOODQWD
French publicist sympathetic to the cause of Romanian national liberation, explained in 1855. 
Nationality constituted the expression of this particular personality, exhibiting the distinctive 
PDUNRIDSHRSOHGHULYHGDFFRUGLQJWR9DLOODQWIURP³WKHVRLOODQJXDJHPRUHVWUDGLWLRQVDQG
belief in the patrie´46 
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Revered by the revolutionary nationalists of the 1790s, the patrieRU³IDWKHUODQG´ZDV
closely bound to conceptions of nationality and persisted to remain a leitmotif of French national 
discourse throughout the nineteenth century. In a public exchange with his cohort Émile de 
Girardin in 1859, the liberal journalist Adolphe Guéroult spoke at length on the meaning of the 
patrie in national life, describing it as the primary locus of experience and identity, whether for 
DQLQGLYLGXDORUDFROOHFWLYHJURXSRISHRSOH³)RUPHWKHpatrie is not only the locality in which 
we were born. It is family, friends, relations, memories and historical tradition. It is the collective 
genius of a race developed through history, written on monuments and in books. It is the moral, 
intellectual and material cradle and the best half of lLIHIRUHDFKRIXV´47 ,Q*XpURXOW¶V
estimation, racial traits and cultural environment were virtually interchangeable, an outlook 
which many conservatives and liberals came to share.48 Whereas the revolutionaries of the 
eighteenth-century had interpreted the nation as a violent rupture with the past, post-
revolutionary generations were inspired by desires to endow nations with a history and 
JHQHDORJ\HOLFLWLQJDVHDUFKIRURULJLQVDQG³DERULJLQDOHVVHQFH´49 If thinkers of the eighteenth-
century prized the universal equality and unity associated with revolutionary nationhood, their 
successors emphasized the unique and particular qualities of the indigenous Kulturstadt. With its 
focus on language³QDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU´ and organic social development, romanticism inscribed 
French national identity with an ethnological and racial content that did not always rest easily 
alongside its revolutionary counterpart. 
In their veneration of nation and nationalité, the Bonapartists frequently made little 
distinction between the varieties of nationalism they promoted, seeing fit to employ one or the 
RWKHUPRGHODVWKHRFFDVLRQZDUUDQWHG%ROVWHULQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\FKDUDFWHUDQG
credentials, statesmen and dignitaries esteemed the popular orientation of imperial politics, 
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LQVLVWLQJDV3HUVLJQ\GLGWKDWWKH6HFRQG(PSLUHZDVEXLOWXSRQ³WKHSULQFLSOHVDQGLGHDVRIWKH
5HYROXWLRQRI´50 Yet this emphasis on national sovereignty remained tempered by the 
more authoritarianism and illiberal tendencies of the regime, discouraging a purely political 
understanding of French society. Parliamentarianism was discouraged on the grounds that it was 
particularly English and, therefore, alien to the natural temperament and character of the French 
people.51 ³7KHIRUPDWLRQRIEnglish nationality has proceeded from totally different means than 
WKRVHIROORZHGIRUWKHIRUPDWLRQRI)UHQFKQDWLRQDOLW\´/RXLV1DSROHRQSURQRXQFHGLQ
when presenting his constitution to the nation.52 It was unfeasible just as much as unnatural to 
expect France to follow the English model of representative government. For the Emperor as 
ZHOODVKLVPRVWIDLWKIXOIROORZHUV³QDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU´ZDVWKHOLIHEORRGRIDQ\VXFFHVVIXO
polity, necessitating a government derived from the natural conditions of the French people and 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VWUDGLWLRQVRIDEVROXWLVPDQGFHQWUDOL]HGDXWKRULW\³7KHWKHRU\WKDWVHHNVWRLPSRVH
WKHVDPHIRUPVWROLEHUW\HYHU\ZKHUH´3HUVLJQ\FRQWHQGHG³LVDVFRQWUDU\WRKLVWRU\DVLWLVWR
UHDVRQ´ )RXQGLQJDJRYHUQPHQW³GHULving at once from the traditions of leadership belonging to 
KLVUDFHDQGKLVRZQLQIRUPHGUHIOHFWLRQV´1DSROHRQ,,,KDG3HUVLJQ\ERDVWHG³HOHYDWHGD
PRQXPHQW´WR)UDQFHEXLOWXSRQ³WKHQDWXUDOIRXQGDWLRQVIRXQGRQLWVVRLO´53 
In cultivating a native identity for the new government, imperial officials relied heavily 
upon a discourse of national particularism that associated the state with a certain history, set of 
traditions and even racial identity. This was not the universal language of the French Revolution 
speaking nor the democratic volunteerism of Rousseau, but rather the primordialism familiar to 
conservative and liberal ideologues. While studies on Bonapartism and the Second Empire have 
frequently stressed the national tenor of imperial politics, the evident contradictions and 
paradoxes replete in this nationalist agenda have yet to be fully examined. In fusing together 
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divergent political and ideological traditions, the Second Empire further encouraged the 
ambiguity surrounding nationalité, infusing it with a mix of territorial, cultural, political and 
racial connotations.  The Bonapartists may have made the idiom of nationalité a staple of French 
political discourse, but they equally inscribed it with a troubling dissonance that drew upon 
universal and particularist ideologies. By mid-century, it was evident that there existed little 
consensus on the specific meaning of the term despite its prominence in Second Empire political 
culture. This confusion would, moreover, become pronounced during the 1860s as the 
%RQDSDUWLVWJRYHUQPHQWIRFXVHGDWWHQWLRQRQ)UDQFH¶VFRORQLDOWHUULWRULHVDQGLQSDUWLFXODU
North Africa, making Algeria a veritable terrain upon which various interpretations of 
nationalité were reified and contested as politicians, statesmen and intellectuals attempted to 
imagine and define the contours of post-revolutionary French society.       
 
Diversity, Unity and the Patrie 
That European nation and empire building proceeded together and mutually influenced one 
another has become a commonplace of historians concerned with the nineteenth century. Yet the 
specific ways in which the cultural and ethnic diversity encountered in the colonies contributed 
to and influenced perceptions of national selfhood during the period begs further scrutiny. 
Algeria, a territory intimately connected to France by virtue of its proximity to the European 
continent and sizeable settler population presents an interesting case study for the intersecting 
trajectories of post-revolutionary nationality and colonialism in an age of national identification. 
The Bonapartists legitimated the political institutions and practices of the Second Empire by 
virtue of their supposedly Gallic character and profound connection to the French people and 
soil. This justification naturally provoked questions regarding the relationship between France 
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and its North African territory inhabited by a sizeable Muslim population and array of European 
immigrants. As French politicians came to speak the language of nationalité during the 1850s 
anGVWKHYH[LQJ³$OJHULDQTXHVWLRQ´EHFDPHQRWRQO\DGHEDWHRQWKHQDWXUHRI)UHQFK
colonialism but, ultimately, one on the French nation and national identity tout court.  
Following the invasion of the Ottoman Maghrib in 1830, King Louis Philippe had 
impulsively annexed swaths of North African territory to the national domain, declaring the 
newly-FUHDWHG$OJHULD³DODQGIRUHYHU)UHQFK´2YHUWKHQH[WIRXUGHFDGHV)UHQFKsettlers and 
metropolitan nationalists inspired by this pronouncement rallied behind the call of O¶$OJpULH
FrançaiseLQVLVWLQJWKDWUDWKHUWKDQDPHUHFRORQLDODSSHQGDJH$OJHULDFRQVWLWXWHGD³QHZ
)UDQFH´DQG ³WUDQV-0HGLWHUUDQHDQSURYLQFH´ connected to the national body.54 Substantiating 
these assertions was, however, problematic in light of evident demographic realities. By the late 
1850s, French colonists accounted for little more than half of a total European population 
amounting to some 188,000, and this was compared to a native population of over two million 
Turks, Arabs, Jews, Moors and Berbers.55 These statistics not only aroused anxieties regarding 
the loyalty of the colonial population, but also raised serious questions as to whether or not 
Algeria, with its patchwork of insular ethnic and religious communities, could even be 
considered French in any meaningful way at all.  
French politicians and nationalists have customarily asserted that the idea of France is 
dependent upon the recognition of organic diversity²WKDW)UDQFHV\PEROL]HV³variété dans 
O¶XQLWp´DVUHSXEOLFDQVOLNHWR say. A nation of varied regional cultures and traditions, France is, 
according to this argument, nonetheless united in its sentiments and values, sharing in a 
quintessential idea of Frenchness that transcends local and ethnic affiliations. This concept was 
quite familiar to many nineteenth-century thinkers and nurtured an appreciation for the cultural 
16 
 
individuality of the varying regional localities constellating the country²the pays. This localism 
frequently stood opposed to the demands for national unity promulgated during the Revolution. 
Jacobin centralists had promoted their nationalist program against the regional diversity found in 
la France profonde, attempting to dissolve local identities through the administrative re-
organization of the country and the suppression of regional patois. These early efforts to create a 
homogenous national community established a tradition of nation building in France that 
remained perennially suspicious of local differences, equating the advent of la nation with the 
eclipse of paysan and regional particularism. In his monumental history of France published in 
-XOHV0LFKHOHWDSSODXGHGZKDWKHGHVFULEHGDV³WKHQDWXUDOSURJUHVVRIOLIH´QRWLQJWKH
disappearance of provincial identities in the countryside with the onset of the great unity which 
ZDVWKH)UHQFKQDWLRQ³,WZDVDWWKHPRPHQWWKDW)UDQFHVXSSUHVVHGZLWKLQKHUERVRPDOO
divergent Frances that she revealed herself in her loftiness and originality. She made the 
discovery of hHUVHOI´56          
While histories of modern France have tended to see the French nation as the creation of 
top-down policies opposed to French provincialism, this image has been subject to revision in 
recent years. As Stéphane Gerson has demonstrated, liberals and conservative notables in the 
post-revolutionary period proposed models contrary to republican national centrism as they 
attempted to restructure French society after the Revolution. Encouraging the writing of local 
histories and the staging of regional exhibitions under the July Monarchy, provincial elites 
ZRUNHGZLWKVWDWHRIILFLDOVLQDFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWGHVLJQHGWREROVWHUD³FXOWRIORFDOPHPRU\´
aimed at constructing a national history and identity rooted in the particularity of provincial life 
DQGWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VHPRtional attachment to both pays and nation.57 Desires to translate the local 
into the national and the national into the local were deemed necessary to realizing the type of 
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democratic society created by the Revolution, a society in which, according to the liberal 
VWDWHVPDQDQGKLVWRULDQ)UDQoRLV*XL]RWWKHFLWL]HQZDVH[SHFWHG³WRWDNHSDUWLQWKHDIIDLUVRI
his pays´58     
 For French settlers in Algeria, however, this sense of local attachment remained an 
DEVWUDFWLRQLQOLJKWRIWKHWHUULWRU\¶VSURPLQHQW³RULHQWDO´IHDWXUHVDQGWKHUHODWLYHO\ORZQXPEHU
of French colonists. As late as 1848, a colon SHWLWLRQLGHQWLILHG³LPSDUWLQJDnationalité´WRWKH
GLYHUVHFRORQLDOSRSXODWLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJ³Dpatrie LQSODFHRIDIRUHLJQODQG´DVWKHSULQFLSDO
task facing the government in Algeria.59 Beginning in the late 1840s, a policy of colonisation 
départemental was implemented to encourage emigration from the metropole and give a more 
pronounced French identity to the colony. The project endeavored to make colonial resettlement 
in the Algerian Tell more attractive through the construction of communities modeled on specific 
provincial villages in France. Families and groups coming from the same department or region 
were settled together with the hope of recreating the camaraderie, local patriotism and 
conviviality of the pays on African soil.60 This effort to replicate distinct French localities 
overseas corresponded with colon GHPDQGVIRU$OJHULD¶VFXOWXUDODQGSROLWLFDODVVLPLODWLRQWRWKH
PHWURSROH$OJHULD¶VXQLTXe mix of Oriental and French features and the patriotism of French 
settlers were touted as examples of both the diversity and unity embodied within the French idea. 
As the critic Arsène Vacherot, a strong proponent of a Gallicized Algeria, acclaimed in 1869, in 
$OJHULDRQHIRXQG³WKHSDVVLRQVRI)UDQFHDWWKHVDPHWLPHDVWKHEHDXWLHVRIWKH2ULHQW´61  
The connection between colonization and nation building was frequently highlighted by 
colon writers and publicists such as Jules Duval, who proclaimed that colonies were nothing less 
WKDQ³WKHSURJHQLWRUVRIQDWLRQV´62 ,Q'XYDO¶VRSLQLRQWKHGLVRUGHUO\FRQJORPHUDWLRQRIZDUULQJ
tribes and ethnic groups inhabiting North Africa could not provide the cohesion or unity essential 
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WRIRXQGLQJDQ$OJHULDQVRFLHW\³There are no intimate relations and solidarities that constitute a 
nationalité >DPRQJWKHQDWLYHWULEHV@´KHREVHUYHG³7KHLGHDRIDpatrie LVXQNQRZQWRWKHP´63 
It was the responsibility of the French, Duval professed, to surmount the tribalism dividing North 
$IULFDQVDQGGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW³WKHSHRSOHRIGLYHUVHRULJLQVKDELWVFXVWRPVODQJXDJHVUDFHV
and religion [inhabiting the region] form only a single people: the Algerian people . . . . 
Tolerance and the admirable sociability of the French spirit [will] nullify old hatreds generally 
EHOLHYHGWREHLQHUDGLFDEOH´64 This ambitious plan of assimilating North African natives to 
French social and cultural norms and creating an Algérie Française was given official 
encouragement in 1858 when the colonial ministry under Prince Jérôme Bonaparte announced its 
LQWHQWLRQRISXUVXLQJDQDJJUHVVLYH*DOOLFL]LQJLQLWLDWLYHLQWKHFRORQ\¶VH[SOLFLWO\$UDEDQG
Muslim territories. Advancing an exceedingly more racialized understanding of nationalité than 
Duval, Prince -pU{PH¶VSROLF\QHYHUWKHOHVVGRYHWDLOHGZLWKWKHJHQHUDOSURSRVLWLRQVRIcolon 
FULWLFVXQDPELJXRXVO\SURFODLPLQJ³ZHDUHLQWKHSUHVHQFHRIDQDUPHGDQGWHQDFLRXV
QDWLRQDOLW\WKDWLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRVXEGXHWKURXJKDVVLPLODWLRQ´65  
This Gallicizing program inspired by colons¶ ³DGPLUDEOHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´RIWKHVWUHQJWK
GHULYHGIURPQDWLRQDO³FRQFRUGDQGXQLW\´DVRQHFRORQLDOSXEOLFLVWSXWLWZDVVKRUWOLYHG%\
1860, the government had begun scaling back or jettisoning altogether many of the tentative 
provision laid out by the colonial administration in 1858.66 This reversal was consistent with the 
(PSHURU¶VHYRlving attitudes on foreign policy, domestic politics and the Algerian question. 
2YHUWDVVLPLODWLRQKDUGO\ILWZLWK1DSROHRQ,,,¶VVWDWHGVXSSRUWIRU WKH³VDFUHGFDXVH´RIQDWLRQDO
self-determination currently being supported in Italy and Romania. Nor did it gel with the 
DOOXVLRQVWRQDWLRQDODQGKHQFH³QDWXUDO´JRYHUQPHQWFRORULQJWKHSROLWLFDOVSHHFKHVRI
Bonapartists spokesmen at home. As part of a general re-thinking of the Algerian question 
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beginning in 1860, Napoleon III endeavored to make the colony a centerpiece of his politique de 
nationalitéSURSRVLQJWR³UHJHQHUDWH´UDWKHUWKDQ³DVVLPLODWH´DPRULEXQG$UDESHRSOH.67 ³:KHQ
France placed its foot on African soil thirty-ILYH\HDUVDJR´WKH(PSHURUH[SODLQHG during a 
VSHHFKJLYHQLQ³LWGLGQRW come to destroy the nationality of a people but, on the contrary, 
WRHOHYDWHWKLVSHRSOHIURPDQROGRSSUHVVLRQ´68  
+DYLQJFRQVWUXFWHGD³PRQXPHQW´WR)UHQFKQDWLRQDOLW\ZLWKWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH
Second Empire, Napoleon III now pledged to do the same for his Muslim subjects across the 
Mediterranean with the creation of an Arab Kingdom. The new course called for communal 
institutions open to Europeans and natives, policy initiatives fostering social and economic 
modernization, and the promotion of a mixed Franco-Muslim education curriculum intent on 
drawing the disparate Maghribi communities to a new Algerian patrie under French aegis.69 To 
give colonial institutions an indigenous character, Napoleon III FRQWLQXHGWKHPLOLWDU\¶VSROLF\RI
native administration, allowing Muslims law courts authority over civil affairs while 
implementing French rule in cooperation with shayks and Muslim notables responsible to their 
local communities. These measures were strategically designed to sustain the presence française 
in Algeria, prescribing a policy of indirect rule in which local officials and community leaders 
functioned as valuable interlocutors between the French administration and the native 
populations.70 Perhaps most galling to proponents of Algérie Française was the proposal of 
integrating Muslims into Algerian society without demanding their explicit assimilation and the 
request that they be thought of DV³FRPSDWULRWV´ 
SHHPLQJO\LQOLQHZLWKWKHQDWLRQDOLVWLGHRORJ\RIWKH%RQDSDUWLVWVWKH(PSHURU¶VQHZ
Algerian policy was, in actuality, motivated by the suggestions of a small, close-knit group of 
colonial administrators and journalists inspired by a mix of liberal values and Saint-Simonian 
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philosophy.71 Chief among these reformers was the military translator and Conseil de 
Gouvernement LQWKHFRORQ\,VKPDHO8UEDLQDNH\SROLF\PDNHUDQGWKH(PSHURU¶Véminence 
grise in Algeria throughout much of the 1860s. In many respects, Urbain was the ideal 
VSRNHVPDQIRUWKH(PSHURU¶VHQYLVDJHG$UDE.LQJGRP$0XVOLPFRQYHUWERUQLQFRORQLDO
Guinea and educated in France, Urbain was a creole proud of his status as an homme de couleur 
and sympathetic to the plight oI)UDQFH¶VFRORQLDOVXEMHFWV$WRQFHEODFNDQGZKLWH&KULVWLDQ
and Muslim, he fashioned himself a man of both East and West, openly declaring his hope of 
³EULQJLQJIRUWKWKHXQLRQRI2ULHQWDQG2FFLGHQW0XVOLPVDQG&KULVWLDQV>DQG@0XVOLPVRFLHW\
with )UHQFKFLYLOL]DWLRQ´72 Accenting his multicultural origins, Urbain reconciled his inherent 
diversity through KLVDVVRFLDWLRQDVD)UHQFKPDQFODLPLQJ³,DPDWRQFH&KULVWLDQDQG0XVOLP
because I am French and this title is for me, at this moment, the most elevated religious and 
FLYLOL]HGTXDOLILFDWLRQ´73  
In cultivating this liminal identity, Urbain was consciously promoting a particular vision 
of France in his very person, one inspired in equal measure by the cosmopolitan universalism of 
the Revolution and the abstract humanitarianism of the Saint-Simonian philosophy in vogue 
during the post-revolutionary period. An acolyte of Propser Enfantin, Urbain had come to share 
KLVPHQWRU¶V FRQYLFWLRQLQPDQ¶VXQLYHUVDOSUogress and its potential to bring IRUWK³Drejuvenated 
FLYLOL]DWLRQQRORQJHURULHQWDORURFFLGHQWDOEXWKXPDQ´74 The colonization of Algeria signaled 
the first step in the advent of this new world order conditioned by global commerce and cultural 
exchange, portending ³D)UDQFHDOLWWOH%HGRXLQDlittle rustic . . . or perhaps a liWWOHSDVKD´
according to Enfantin.75 Like Enfantin, Urbain was convinced France alone was best suited to 
serve as the custodian of this dynamic world civilization on the cusp of realization, for beneath 
the unanimity nurtured by French nationality persisted a rich and diverse mosaic of customs, 
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languages and populations that discouraged exceedingly reductive understandings of identity and 
cultureZKDW8UEDLQGHQRXQFHGDVD³JHQHUDOXQLIRUPLW\´76 ³&DQZHVWLOOQRWGLVWLQJXish the 
GLYHUVLW\RILWVRULJLQVLQWKHGLIIHUHQWSURYLQFHV´KHasked rhetorically LQ³GHVSLWHWKHIDFW
WKDW)UDQFHLVRQHRIWKHPRVWKRPRJHQRXVQDWLRQVLQ(XURSHWRGD\"´77 While this conception of 
Frenchness reflected the belief that French nationality embodied ³YDULpWpGDQVO¶XQLWp´ZKDWVHW
8UEDLQ¶VYLHZVDSDUWIURPWKHPDLQVWUHDPRI)UHQFKQDWLRQDOLVPZDVhis willingness to extend 
this celebration of diversity to non-European cultures and imagine a cosmopolitan nation that cut 
across civilizational and racial boundaries.  
Formulating his politique indigèneRU³Nativism´78 which would provide the basis for 
1DSROHRQ,,,¶V Arab Kingdom experiment, Urbain expressed his conviction that national unity 
need not preclude pluralism. Progress implied, in KLVRSLQLRQ³PXOWLSOLFLW\ZKLOHDWWKHVDPH
WLPHXQLW\LQWKHKXPDQGHVWLQ\´$OJHULDQVRFLHW\ZDVQRWWREHFRQGLWLRQHGE\WKH³PRQRWRQH
XQLIRUPLW\´RIFXOWXUDODVVLPLODWLRQEXWUDWKHUXQLILHGWKURXJKWKH³KDUPRQLFPXOWLSOLFLW\´RILWV
diverse cultural traits and makeup.79 $WWHPSWLQJWR³VXGGHQO\FKDnge the habits, mores and laws 
of a population which hardly knows us, which perhaps fears us, but which certainly does not love 
us,´KHXUJHGZDVDVGDQJHURXVDVLWZDV impractical.80 Infinitely more fruitful was a program 
that rejected compulsory assimilation and charted DFRXUVHIRU$OJHULDQ0XVOLPV³LQOLQHZLWK
WKHLUQRUPDOGHYHORSPHQWOLQNLQJWKHLUSDVWSUHVHQWDQGIXWXUH´81 ³)RUHDFKLQGLYLGXDODVIRU
each group there is a point of departure and a partiFXODUDLP´8UEDLQFRQWHQGHGDUJXLQJWKDWLW
ZDVYLWDO³WRFRQVXOWWKHWUDGLWLRQVDQGPHPRULHVRIHDFKDQGDOO´LQIRUPXODWLQJVRFLDODQG
political policies.82 Much as Bonapartist ideologues in France avowed, government, if it was to 
be considered legitimate, must be indigenous and accord with the historical development and 
customs of the people it represented. To proceed otherwise would jeopardize the core values of 
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national OLEHUW\FHQWUDOWR)UDQFH¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\KHULWDJH,QKLVVWULGHQWGHIHQVHRIWKH Maghribi 
QDWLYHVSHQQHGLQ8UEDLQ¶VFRKRUW)UpGpULF/DFURL[VXPPDUL]HGWKHPDWWHUEOXQWO\
³$OJHULDZLOOQHYHUEHFRPHD)UHQFK3RODQG´83 
Taking aim at the colonial lobby, Nativists drew attention to and, at times, exaggerated 
the racism and national chauvinism of colonists, painting a dismal portrait of an Algeria 
traumatized by fierce racial and confessional KDWUHGV³,EHOLHYHWKDWWKH$UDEVQHHGWREH
SURWHFWHG´%DURQ-pU{PH'DYLGDNH\VSRNHVPDQIRUWKH(PSHURU¶V$OJHULDQSROLFLHVLQWKH
senaWHVWDWHGZKHQGLVFXVVLQJWKHUROHRIWKHPLOLWDU\LQWKHFRORQ\³WKDWWKH\FDQQRWEH
GHOLYHUHGWRWKHGHVLJQVRIWKHFRORQLVWV´84 Assessing the situation following the declaration of 
the Arab Kingdom in 1863, Lacroix expressed similar misgivings. Reproaching settlers for the 
abuse and exploitation they meted out on Algerian Muslims, the fiery polemicist did not hesitate 
WRFRPSDUHWKHVLWXDWLRQWRWKHGHPRUDOL]LQJVODYHUHJLPHVRIWKH:HVW,QGLHV³7KHSUHMXGLFHV
that once separated whites from the black race in the Antilles are today projected onto the Arabs 
LQ$IULFDLQDOOLWVYLROHQFHDQGEOLQGQHVV´85 In his opinion, the settlers were all too willing to 
³VHOO$UDEQDWLRQDOLW\VKRUW´LQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQWKHLUSULYLOHJHGVWDWXVLQWKHFRORQ\ 
While colonists demanding Algérie Française categorically denied that North Africans, 
ZLWKWKHLU³WULEDO´PRUHVDQGLQVXODUFODQVSRVVHssed a national consciousness, Nativists like 
Lacroix countered these assertions, insisting that the Arabs had in fact conserved the distinctive 
WUDLWVRIWKHLUQDWLRQDOLW\GHVSLWHFHQWXULHVRIIRUHLJQUXOHDQGRSSUHVVLRQ³,WLVWUXHWKDW>WKH
FRORQLVWV@WDNHWKHSRVLWLRQRISXUHO\DQGVLPSO\GHQ\LQJ$UDEQDWLRQDOLW\´KHVHHWKHG³,W¶V
easier, but the Austrians also deny the existHQFHRIDQ,WDOLDQQDWLRQDOLW\´86 Comparing the 
current situation in North Africa to the repressive empires of the Habsburgs and Russian Tsars, 
Nativists SOHGJHGWRUHIRUPWKHQDWLRQ¶V³FLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQ´LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK)UDQFH¶VYDOXHV
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of tolerance, eTXDOLW\DQGQDWLRQDOULJKW³7KHEORRGWKDWIORZVLQWKHYHLQVRIRXU$UDEVLVWKH
VDPHDVWKH$UDEVGXULQJWKHILUVWDJHRI,VODP´WKHJHQHUDO&KDUOes Nicolas Lacretelle wrote in 
³>DQG@ZKDWWKHLUIRUHIDWKHUVZHUHWKH$UDEVRIRXUGD\FDQDQGPXVWEHFRPHDJDLQ´87 
³$PRQJWKH$UDEUDFHWKHUHDUHDOOWKHQHFHVVDU\HOHPHQWVWRFRQVWLWXWHDQDWLRQ´8UEDLQ
hypothesized³QRWE\WKHPRGHOVRI(XURSHDQQDWLRQVEXWDQ2ULHQWDODQG0XVOLPQDWLRQWKDW
will take from our civilization only what its faith, customs and character permit it to 
DVVLPLODWH´88  
$OOXVLRQVWR$UDEQDWLRQDOLW\DQG³UHJHQHUDWLQJ´DIDOOHQSHRSOHSHUYDGHG1DWLYLVW 
rhetoric, accenting the emancipatory and nationalist objectives of creating a new patrie for 
)UDQFH¶V$UDEVXEMHFWV<HW the prescribed formula of civilizing through nationalizing central to 
8UEDLQ¶VSODQRIWHQXQGHUFXWWKHVXSSRVHGFXOWXUDOUHODWLYLVPXSRQZKLFKLWUHVWHG7KHQRWLRQRI
D1RUWK$IULFDQ$UDE.LQJGRPZDVDOZD\VPRUHLGHRORJLFDOILFWLRQWKDQUHDOLW\³$UDE´
constituted a generic term applied by French administrators to a diverse and heterogeneous North 
African population and, consequently, carried little currency amongst native groups which 
neither spoke Arabic nor identified with an Arab nationality.89 In deemLQJ$OJHULDDQ³$UDE´
Kingdom, French officials were, in actuality, working to create the very nationality that their 
cultural and political policies claimed to represent and protect, Arabizing various non-Arab 
groups like the Turks, Moors and Berbers in tKHSURFHVV'HIHQGLQJWKH(PSHURU¶VSROLF\LQ
%DURQ'DYLGRSHQO\DSSODXGHGWKHPLOLWDU\¶VLQWHQWLRQRI³FUHDWLQJZKDWKDGQRW
SUHYLRXVO\H[LVWHGWKDW$UDEQDWLRQDOLW\ZKLFKKDVEHJXQWRDSSHDU´90 Although Urbain 
candidly admitted that concepts of nationhood and nationality were European imports, stating 
WKDW³QDWLRQDOLW\DVLWLVNQRZQWR(XURSHVWLOOUHPDLQVRQO\DODWHQWLGHDDPRQJWKHVH
SRSXODWLRQVGLYLGHGLQWRWULEHVDWWDFKHGWRGLYHUVHDQGKRVWLOHRULJLQV´KHQHYHUWKHOHVVFRQWLQXHG
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to believe WKDWQDWLRQDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQZKHQSXUVXHGZLWKFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUWKH³QRUPDO
GHYHORSPHQW´RIDSHRSOHVLJQLILHGDXQLYHUVDOVWDJHLQKXPDQLW\¶VVRFLDOHYROXWLRQ91 
³7KHLGHDRISURJUHVV´8UEDLQZURWHLQ³LPSOLHVPXOWLSOLFLW\ZKLOHDWWKHVDPH
time XQLW\LQWKHKXPDQGHVWLQ\´92 7KLVVHQWLPHQWERWKFRQVWLWXWHGWKHFUX[RI8UEDLQ¶VQDWLYH
policy and, ironically, undermined its very foundation. Endeavoring to inculcate an Arab 
national consciousness among the Algerian indigènes and revive a decadent Oriental civilization, 
Nativists relied upon a conception of Arab modernity defined in exceedingly Eurocentric terms, 
imposing revolutionary constructs like nationalité and la nation on a society estranged from 
(XURSH¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\H[SHULHQFH$VWKHDQWKUopologist Jean-Loup Amselle has aptly noted, 
)UHQFKREMHFWLYHVWRUHJHQHUDWH$UDEQDWLRQDOLW\DPRXQWHGWRDSROLF\RI³DVVLPLODWLYH
UHJHQHUDWLRQ´ZKLFKDWRQFHUHFRJQL]HGWKH$UDEVDVDFXOWXUDOO\GLVWLQFWJURXSZKLOHLQWHQGLQJ
WR³FLYLOL]H´WKHPLQDFFRUGance with European norms.93 Urbain, like many of his 
contemporaries, equated Frenchness with civilization itself. He never doubted the universality 
which French values purportedly embodied or their potential of transcending the varieties of 
human diversity and experience. He also never doubted his cultural relativism either, perennially 
DIILUPLQJWKDWGLVWLQFWLYH³KDUPRQLFPXOWLSOLFLW\´ZKLFK)UHQFK nationality was best suited to 
realize.  
Colon responses to the Arab Kingdom policy were nothing short of hostile. Waves of 
protests erupted in the major cities of the colony and colonial journals spared no ink in 
denouncing what they saw as a blatant betrayal to French nationality and civilization. Drawing 
upon familiar colonial stereotypes, critics attacked the very basis of the Arab Kingdom, insisting 
that the lack of a national consciousness among the Arab people could not serve to unify a 
society³,QRUGHUWRH[LVW´DVRQHcolon SXEOLFLVWH[SODLQHG³DQDWLRQGHPDQGVDGHJUHHRI
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civilization that is impossibOHWRILQGDPRQJWKHVHVDYDJHDQGPRURQLFSHRSOH´94 More 
important, however, was the challenge that an Arabized Algeria posed to the cultural integrity of 
Algérie Française. An Arab Kingdom threatened to undermine the very foundation of French 
nationalité²unity²leaving colons bereft of a common patrie, community and national culture 
ZKLFKDIILUPHGRQHDV)UHQFK³7KHLQWHUHVWRIWKHFRORQ\WKHKRQRURI)UDQFHDQGWKHWULXPSh of 
FLYLOL]DWLRQ´WKHMRXUQDOLVW$OH[DQGUH/DPEHUWFKDUJHG³GHPDQGWKDWZHVHDUFKby all possible 
PHDQVWRXQLI\DOOWKHGLYHUVHSRSXODWLRQVLQWRDVLQJOHSHRSOH´95 Without this quintessential 
mark of Frenchness, the settler community would find themselves effectively dépaysé. 
The Arab Kingdom controversy brought into sharp relief the tension inherent within 
FXOWXUDOGHILQLWLRQVRIQDWLRQDOLW\DQGWKH)UHQFKLGHDORI³GLYHUVLW\LQXQLW\´7\LQJnationalité 
to the idea of the patrie, post-revolutionary thinkers of varying ideological positions insisted on 
the vital role that culture, custom and shared mores played in defining a community. The 
diversity of colonial Algeria, however, elicited fundamental questions on the nature of French 
identity and the unity it ostensibly promoted. Proponents of Algérie Française looked askance at 
the heterogeneous colonial population and prospect of a hybridic Franco-Muslim society, seeing 
them as impediments to the unity which a common French culture, sociability and identity 
promised. For Nativists like Urbain and Lacroix, however, the essence of French nationalité was 
precisely its ability to sustain unity across cultural and racial boundaries. Blending cultural 
nationalism with universalized notions of civilization and progress, Nativism attempted to 
balance pluralism with social cohesion, seeing little conflict in cultivating indigenous and 
particular forms of identification while integrating them into an exceedingly multicultural vision 
of society. Confident in his assertions that France symbolized unity in the midst of diversity, 
Urbain always perceived Algeria as the terrain upon which the universal and cosmopolitan 
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attributes of French nationality would receive their true baptism, presaging a society neither 
wholly European nor Muslim but French.96 The cultural relativism sanctioned by his brand of 
Nativism was, however, highly problematic, at once recognizing diversity while dissolving it 
within a holistic and universalized idea of French cultural values.  
Entrenched in the language of patrie, pays and cultural primordialism, conceptions of 
post-revolutionary nationalité often proved difficult to reconcile with the republican rhetoric of 
French universalism. Yet it should be recalled that efforts to imagine a trans-Mediterranean 
French community during the nineteenth century did not derive from strict republican principles 
either and often mapped divergent ideas of nationality that deviated from the centrism and 
national unity prized by republicans. Drawing upon a rich stock of ideological opinion, colonial 
administrators and critics blended an appreciation for culturally-determined identities, local 
particularism and Enlightenment cosmopolitanism as they attempted to contend with the 
diversity of North African society. In so doing, they outlined potential alternatives to republican 
nationhood that illuminated the latent possibilities of imagining a multi-ethnic and multicultural 
France distinct from the communitarianism and assimilation of republican national discourse.        
 
Frenchmen, French Citizens and the Prominence of Nationalité 
The formulation of alternatives to republican nationalité did not, however, entail the 
disappearance of competing discourses rooted in a language of rights and citizenship. On the 
contrary, the late 1840s witnessed a revival of republican egalitarian universalism, culminating in 
the collapse of the July Monarchy and the declaration of universal manhood suffrage in 1848. 
That spring, the Second Republic recognized the three northern provinces of Algeria as de facto 
French departments and permitted colons to participate in national elections. In the words of one 
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GHSXW\$OJHULDZDVWRV\PEROL]HWKHYDOXHVRIWKHQHZUHSXEOLFVWDQGLQJDV³DJUHDW
PRQXPHQW´RQZKLFK)UDQFHZRXOG³LPSULQWWKHVHDORILWVSULQFLSOHVDQGnationalité´97 Colon 
publicists like Amédée-Hippolyte Brossard concurred, emphasizing the strong correlation 
EHWZHHQFLWL]HQVKLSDQGQDWLRQDOEHORQJLQJ³7KHpatrie is the soil, the family, [but also] the title 
RIFLWL]HQULJKWVGXWLHVDQGWKHDIIHFWLRQVZKLFKGHULYHIURPWKHP´$OJHULDFRXOGRQO\EH
considered )UHQFK%URVVDUGDUJXHGLI³WKHULJKWVRI>FRORQLDO@FLWL]HQVZHUHUHVSHFWHGDQG
PDLQWDLQHG´LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK)UHQFKODZ98 
 The relationship between race and colonial citizenship institutionalized under the Third 
Republic has been well documented.99 Until 1871, however, this hallmark feature of French 
colonial society had yet to be formalized. Under the Second Empire, colonists did not possess the 
same political rights enjoyed by their metropolitan counterparts and suffered many of the same 
limitations that subjecthood imposed on natives. Although the civil code continued to assure 
equal rights to all French nationals, colonies proved exceptions to metropolitan standards. As 
French settlers migrated across the empire and took up residence beyond the continent, they 
found themselves subject to colonial regimes reluctant to concede the basic liberties granted to 
metropolitan citizens. Colons protesting against their disenfranchisement upheld that ³WKHWLWOHRI
)UHQFK´DQG³WKHWLWOHRIFLWL]HQ´ZHUHFORVHO\Oinked if not synonymous. ³%HWZHHQWKHFLWL]HQV
RI)UDQFHDQGWKHFLWL]HQVRIWKHFRORQLHV´-XOHV'XYDOpointedly asked LQ³DUHZHWR
presume that there exists such a difference in nature that one has the right of universal suffrage 
while the other oQO\DSULYLOHJHGVXIIUDJH"´100    
Colonial publicists may have given credence to the idea of a French cultural community, 
but they never relinquished the belief that Frenchness was a quality obtained by virtue of 
belonging to and participating in a national political community either. In their defense of 
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Algérie Française, colons often conflated civic and cultural ideas of nationality, promoting 
Algerian cultural assimilation while espousing the language of French republicanism and its 
veneration of the community of citizens. It was, therefore, not surprising that key metropolitan 
republicans were among the most vocal defenders of the Algerian settler community during the 
V$WWDFNLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V$OJHULDQSROLFLHVbefore the Corps législatif in 1868, Jules 
)DYUHGHHPHGWKHPDQHJUHJLRXVYLRODWLRQRI)UHQFK³Oaw and nationalité´³$OJHULDOLNH
France, has contributed to constituting this society´KHGHFODUHG. ³Like France, it is French 
because it is its blood, its substance, its moral character . . . [and] like France, it has the right to 
EHUHSUHVHQWHGDQG\RXFDQQRWVWULSLWRIWKLVH[SHFWDWLRQZLWKRXWXVXUSLQJDXWKRULW\´101 Blood, 
³PRUDOFKDUDFWHU´DQGSROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOOFDPHWRJHWKHULQ)DYUH¶VFULWLFLVP
demonstrating the extent to which understanding of nationalité drew upon and conflated racial, 
cultural and civic models. Yet for colons eager to access the levers of political power at the local 
and national level, the issue of rights and political inclusion was paramount. Clément Duvernois, 
a journalist and unrelenting critic of the colonial regime, summed up the position of the settlers 
succinctly in 1858³,IZHZDQW$OJHULDWREHDQGUHPDLQ)UHQFKWKHQZHPXVWJLYHWRLWV
LQKDELWDQWVWKHVDPHSROLWLFDOULJKWVDVWKRVHRIWKH)UHQFK´102 
Defining French nationals in terms of civil liberties and collective rights appealed to the 
Rousseauvian ideal of the civil and political community just as much as the revolutionary 
principle of égalité devant la loi. Yet allusions to republican political tradition often concealed 
underlying anxieties stemming from the negligible French presence in North Africa and its 
implications for French control in the colony. The settler population comprised a mix of 
FRQWLQHQWDOQDWLRQDOLWLHVOHJDOO\FDWHJRUL]HGDV³(XURSHDQ´VLQFH103 The diversity of the 
settler community, Andrea Smith has argued, persistently undermined the fiction of a 
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homogenous ruling class and threatened to destabilize the dichotomies of colonizer and 
colonized which buttressed French power in Algeria.104 Encouraging civic participation, 
especially at the local levels of colonial society, offered a viable means of unifying the 
YDULHJDWHG(XURSHDQFRPPXQLWLHVVFDWWHUHGDFURVV1RUWK$IULFD³,QDFRORQ\FRPSRVHGRIVXFK
GLYHUVHHOHPHQW´H[SODLQHGRQHFRXQFLOPHPEHULQWKHSURYLQFHRI&RQVWDQWLQH³WKHcommune 
becomes ever more necessary. Because it exercises a strong force on individuals, it becomes the 
first link attaching them to a new patrie´105 2QO\E\JLYLQJ³QDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´WR$OJHULD, as 
the colon journalist Arnold Thomson explained, would the multi-national settler community 
come to see itself as French.106 
This emphasis on local attachment, while consistent with earlier liberal and conservative 
efforts to root national belonging in the natural affection for the pays, nonetheless differed 
markedly in its focus on civic ideals and political volunteerism. Much like the program advanced 
by liberal-republican reformers in metropolitan France during the 1860s,107 colon spokesmen 
argued that local government comprised the lifeblood of a society, nourishing the patriotism and 
FRPPXQDOVROLGDULWLHVXSRQZKLFKQDWLRQVZHUHEXLOW(VWDEOLVKLQJ³OHJDODQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
XQLW\´WKURXJKRXW$OJHULD7KRPVRQDUJXHGLQZRXOGSURYLGHWKHILUVWVWHSLn fusing the 
mélange of ethnicities and nationalities into a single French people, tying them to a new 
patrie.108 Frenchness, in other words, was equated with belonging to a community of citizens 
brought together through the recognition of equal rights, shared interests and common 
institutions.   
Inscribing national belonging within the legal and political discourse of modern 
citizenship theoretically divested French nationalité of any racial or ethnic connotations. The 
³TXDOLW\RI)UHQFK´ZDVGHSHQGHQWXSRQthe endowment of rights and adherence to the laws 
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common to all. Yet this rationale conveniently justified the exclusion of Algerian natives.109 The 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VPDLQWHQDQFHRIFXVWRPDU\DQGWUDGLWLRQDO legal codes in Algeria allowed for the 
practice of SharƯ¶DDQG+HEUDLFODZLQFLYLODIIDLUVrecognizing separate and distinct legal 
systems for the Europeans and Algerian natives respectively.110 The special legal status granted 
to natives proved an exception to the principle of égalité devant la loi, a fact which colons and 
republicans insisted set them apart from the nation³,QSULQFLSOHWKH$UDEVZLOOKDYHWKHULJKW
of a citizen only if they acFHSWWKH)UHQFKFRGH´'XYHUQRLVH[SODLQHG111 Unless Muslims 
abandoned their adherence to Quranic law and submitted fully to the civil code they could not be 
considered equals, making citizenship tantamount to apostasy. A French Algeria, according to 
7KRPVRQZDV³GHSHQGHQWXSRQDSSO\LQJDVLQJOHOHJLVODWLRQWRDOOWKRVHFDUU\LQJWKHQDPH
)UHQFK´112  
Despite the ostensibly de-racialized logic of republican isonomy, scholars have correctly 
noted the ethno-racial biases built in to modern French citizenship. Longstanding and overly-
generalized assumptions on the part of French critics regarding the centrality of Islamic ritual 
and practice to the culture and daily life of Muslims have patently denied the possibility of 
VHSDUDWHUHOLJLRXVDQGVHFXODUVSKHUHV7KLVDFWRIVDWXUDWLQJ0XVOLPVZLWK³0XVOLPQHVV´DV
Naomi Davidson has put it, effectively collapsed racial and ethnic differences into a discourse of 
religious distinction, inscribing Muslim confessional identity with implicit racial qualities.113 The 
correlation between rights, French law and national belonging during the 1860s obfuscated the 
ethnic and racial attributes associated with Frenchness, denoting religion and not biology as a 
FHQWUDOPDUNHURIGLIIHUHQFH:LWKLQWKLV³KLGGHQORJLFRIH[FOXVLRQ´OD\WKHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIWKH
ethno-political order essential for a French-dominated Algeria.114  
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In a rare moment of consensus between the Nativist camp and settlers, Urbain concurred 
ZLWKWKLVMXGJPHQW³%HFDXVHWKHQDWLYHVZLOOQRWDOORZDUDGLFDOVHSDUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVSLULWXDO
and temporal, because their culture and religious dogmas are in contradiction with our FRGHV´KH
DUJXHG³WKH\VKRXOGQRWEHLQYHVWHGZLWKWKHWLWOHRI)UHQFKFLWL]HQV´115 France could hardly 
compel Muslims to repudiate their faith and religious conventions; yet it could not invalidate the 
basic principles upon which its society was founded either. Under the circumstances, citizenship 
would have to be a personal choice for Algerians rather than a universal condition. Only once the 
³FLYLOL]LQJ´LQIOXHQFHVGLVVHPLQDWHGE\)UDQFHKDGWDNHQURRWDQGWKH4XU¶DQEHFDPHDSXUHO\
religious book and not a text for civil legislation could Muslims be considered for citizenship.116 
For Urbain, the question of citizenship was, ultimately, secondary. The primary question was 
how to make the natives French, and this had more to do with nurturing shared interests among 
the two populations of the colony and attaching them to a patrie than with political rights. Inthis 
respect, Urbain believed it preferable to facilitate the process of native integration by opening 
positions in the civil bureaucracy to Muslims and assuring eligibility to state benefits. With these 
measures in place, equal relations between the native and European populations would be 
assured, providing an institutional framework for the development of the Franco-Arab society he 
imagined.117 
In the spring of 1865, a senatorial committee was convened to address the status of 
Algerian natives. Following a series of debates, the senate ruled in favor of naturalizing the 
Algerians, conferring French nationality by virtue of ius soli. This blanket naturalization marked 
DFOHDUYLFWRU\IRU8UEDLQDQGKLVKRSHRIDWWDLQLQJ³WKHIXVLRQRIWKHWZRUDFHVLQFLYLOHTXDOLW\
freedom of religion . . . [and] tolerance for mores while brining [the natives] more into line with 
RXUFLYLOL]DWLRQ´118 In more specific terms, the resolution officially endorsed his policy of native 
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integration by determining formal procedures through which Algerians might acquire French 
citizenship once they had obtained a sufficient level of civilization. Writing to the governor 
general of AOJHULDWKDW-XQH1DSROHRQ,,,VXPPHGXSWKHYHUGLFWFRQFLVHO\³7KH$UDEVDUH
)UHQFKVLQFH$OJHULDLVD)UHQFKWHUULWRU\´119 Yet if the Arabs were French, the ruling of 1865 
confirmed them so only as nationals, not citizens. Algerian naturalisés were not obliged to 
submit to the French civil code and, therefore, continued to retain their special status under 
traditional law, upholding the conviction that citizenship must be a personal and individual 
choice.120 While Muslims were recognized as French nationals VKDULQJLQWKHQDWLRQ¶V³JUHDW
SROLWLFDOXQLW\´DV8UEDLQFODLPHGWKHLUOHJDOVWDWXVFRQWLQXHGWRDIILUPWKHLUDWWDFKPHQWWRDQ
external community, rendering them nominal Frenchmen bereft of the civil and political liberties 
accorded to citizens.121  
The compromise reached between the principle of unity under French law and respect for 
religious pluralism in 1865 marked a watershed in the debates over Frenchness generated by the 
Algerian question. The revolutionary conception of nationalité enshrined in the civil code was 
abandoned, recognizing a distinction between Frenchmen and French citizens that possessed 
ominous implications for the future. While post-revolutionary liberalism had never equated 
national belonging with political participation, the senatorial decision broke with liberal tradition 
in key ways. The ruling of 1865 defined citizenship as submission to the French code but 
allowed for the possibility of French nationals subject to different and distinct legal systems, 
undermining the principle of legal equality central to classical liberalism.122 Unmoored from a 
political-legal context, nationalité became a distinct concept in its own right, indicating the 
extent to which the intellectual and political milieu of the mid-nineteenth century encouraged a 
re-WKLQNLQJRI)UDQFH¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\KHULWDJH7KHGLVFRXUVHRIULJKWVDQGFLWL]HQVKLS
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FKDPSLRQHGE\UHSXEOLFDQVDQGFRORQLVWVFRQWLQXHGWRGHILQHRQHLGHDRI)UHQFKQHVVWKDW³WUXH´
France, as Ian Coller has called it, making up the community of citizens, but henceforth it could 
never make authoritative claims to encompass the total of what it meant to be French.123 In spite 
of all their affirmations and insistence that Frenchness was synonymous with the rights of the 
citizen, republicans and colonists never challenged the verdict that Frenchmen need not be 
French citizens. The senatorial mandate offered the necessary legitimation for the Algérie 
Française they desired, furnishing the rationale for the power relations and exclusionary policies 
of the future colonial republic.   
 
Conclusion 
The years of Bonapartist rule marked a pivotal moment in the debates on Frenchness first 
inaugurated by the revolutionary upheavals of the late-eighteenth century. Throughout the 
period, the saliency of nationalité in political and cultural discourse came to define competing 
ideas of what it meant to be French, ideas that ranged from the political and cosmopolitan to the 
HWKQLFDQGFXOWXUDO7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶V$OJHULDQSROLFLHVZRXOGEULQJWKHVHULYDOFRQFHSWLRQVRI
Frenchness into sharp relief as the question of what defined a society and people as French 
became distilled within more fundamental questions of assimilating nominal foreigners or 
tolerating diversity. In addressing the Algerian question, French politicians, opinion leaders and 
DGPLQLVWUDWRUVIDFHGFRPSOH[LVVXHVSHUWDLQLQJWRVRFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQDQGWKHQDWLRQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVV
WRWROHUDWHFXOWXUDOGLIIHUHQFHDVWKH\DWWHPSWHGWRRXWOLQHSROLFLHVIRU)UDQFH¶V0XVOLP
populations across the Mediterranean. In the minds of both colon activists and colonial officials, 
these issues were rarely divorced from a larger debate on the French nation. As a point of 
convergence for both national and colonial discourses, North Africa provided a canvas upon 
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which to imagine and reify prevailing ideas of Frenchness just as much as a laboratory for testing 
their possibilities. At once fashioned in the image of France and serving as an object against 
which French identity was constructed and projected, Algeria reflected the mythologies and 
tensions inherent within the idea of France itself.124   
Efforts to reimagine society in radically new terms in the post-revolutionary period raised 
a series of questions which were not easily resolvable: What role was local identification to play 
in prRPRWLQJQDWLRQDODIILOLDWLRQ"&RXOGFRORQLDOLVPEHPDGHFRPSDWLEOHZLWK)UDQFH¶V
revolutionary values and heritage? To what extent could French nationalité accommodate 
difference without sacrificing unity? The conquest of Algeria both amplified and modified these 
questions as administrators and colonial publicists attempted to define the contours of a trans-
Mediterranean French community spanning two continents. Much like the contradictory variants 
of nationalité endorsed by the Bonapartist regime at home, colonial policymakers found it 
difficult to escape the contradictions posed by cultural essentialism and cosmopolitanism that 
had plagued French national discourse since the Revolution. Tolerance always rested uneasily 
with French desires for unity, and questions pertaining to French national identity frequently 
witnessed the anthropological man of the Romantics grapple with the abstract individual of 
Rousseau and the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, the experiment in French multiculturalism 
carried out during the years of the Second Empire did compel a sharp reassessment of the 
meanings implicit within core concepts like citizenship, nationality and community that held 
SURIRXQGLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU)UDQFH¶VUHYROXWLRQDU\KHULWDJHDQGWKHSULQFLSOHVRI 
Today controversial anti-immigrant legislation, perpetuated stereotypes and an aggressive 
secularism have aggravated efforts to promote cultural diversity and acknowledge a public 
identity for French Muslims. Yet these mark only the latest instances in a much longer historical 
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trend that has cut across the narrative of French modernity. While critics point to the notorious 
³headscarf affair´ or the Pasqua Laws of 1993 DVV\PEROVRI)UDQFH¶VKRVWLOLW\WRGLYHUVLW\, one 
could equally recall the comment made by the colon Wilfrid de Fonvielle in 1860 who bemoaned 
WKHIDFWWKDWWKH$UDEVKDG³VWLOOQRWIRXQGWKHLUSODFHLQ$OJHULDQVRFLHW\´125 While 
decolonization²or the war of Algerian liberation, depending on how one looks at it²has made 
the question of whether or not Muslims might find their place in Algerian society a moot point, 
the question asked by many French intellectuals and polemicists today continues to be whether 
Muslims will find their place in French society rather than whether French society will find a 
pODFHIRUWKHP,I1DSROHRQ,,,¶V$UDE.LQJGRPLVLQVWUXFWLYHLQKLJKOLJKWLQJWKHSDWKRORJLFDO
nature of French multiculturalism, its legacy continues to be felt today in state initiatives to 
fashion a moderate and Gallicized brand of Islam (Islam française) DQGWKHUHWHQWLRQRI³ORFDO´
statutes among populations in overseas territories, policies which persist to see the state as an 
arbiter between culturally distinct groups and communities situated at the margins of the 
nation.126 Nativism, removed from its colonial context, has assumed the more neutral handle of 
³LQWHJUDWLRQ´HIIHFWLYHO\³EULQLQJWKHHPSLUHEDFNKRPH´DVHerman Lebovics has claimed. 
Identity politics and the shifting cultural geographies encouraged by globalization and 
transnational migrations have brought claims of French universality into question and drawn 
reactions from right-wing ideologues who profess desires WR³.HHS)UDQFH)UHQFK´la France 
aux françaises!). These two positions rooted in universal and particular conceptions of French 
nationality have remained central to the politics of Frenchness and continue to inscribe French 
identity with both ethnic and cosmopolitan qualities that prove difficult to reconcile. French 
UHSXEOLFDQLVP¶VHPSKDVLVRQXQLW\DQGLWVUHIXVDOWRUHFRJQL]H distinct communities within the 
civil and political spheres has posed the challenge of cultural diversity in exceedingly binary 
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terms: pluralism or republicanism; equal rights or special consideration.127 Retracing the history 
of the Arab Kingdom suggests, however, that the dissonance between French and Muslim need 
not be contained merely within the familiar binary constructions of self and other, Christianity 
and Islam, secular and religious. The idea of a French Arab Kingdom did offer the prospect of 
transcending such oppositions even as its conflicting principles served to reinforce and 
crystallize many of them. If today politicians insist that the French do not want ³DSX]]OHRI
cultures, faiths and traditions slowly disfiguring our national identity,´128 it is worthwhile to 
recall that for a man like Urbain the possibility of embracing this cultural jigsaw was, ultimately, 
one of the most endearing aspect of French society. As critics speculate on whether or not French 
republicanism can successfully come to terms with the diversity accommodating a pluralist and 
globalized world, it is perhaps instructive to revisit the alternative approach to diversity 
HPEHGGHGZLWKLQ)UDQFH¶V past.  
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